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This article considers the legal basis and functioning of the Order of Australia in general, with special 
reference to the innovations under the prime ministership of Tony Abbott : his two schemes for 
again awarding Knighthoods in the Order, the first of which bypassed the Council of the Order, as 
well as his decision to award a Knighthood to Prince Philip.  The separate roles of the Council, the 
Governor-General and The Queen are outlined.  International comparisons with Canada and New 
Zealand are made and case law on honours considered.  Other questions not examined by scholars 
to date include whether failure to confer, or the deprivation of an award in the Order can be re-
viewed in administrative law.  The article concludes by asking what reforms could be made to place 
the Order on a firmer legal basis, avoid any further embarrassing adventurism and further reinforce 
the Order’s independence from politicians. 
 
 
                                                             
* Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.  Professor of Law, University of Adelaide; Honorary Professor of Law, 
Marburg University, Germany; Honorary Professor, R.M.I.T. University, Melbourne.  The author would like to 
thank Dr Yee-Fui Ng for providing useful references during research for this article and Dr Christopher McCre-
ery M.V.O. for helpfully providing information about the Order of Canada and general comments on a draft.  
Thanks are also due to the Honours and Symbols Section of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The reintroduction of Australian Knighthoods1 seemed, at the time (March 2014), to be hard to top in 
terms of unforeseeability,2 not to say eccentricity – until, to the astonishment of a whole nation, one 
was conferred upon a defenceless Prince Philip on Australia Day 2015.  Sufficient time has probably 
now elapsed since these incidents for a dispassionate examination of the legal aspects of them by a 
scholar who is not wholly unsympathetic to the ideas behind the reintroduction of a titular distinction 
in the Order of Australia.  It hardly needs to be said that the salesmanship of this idea left a good deal 
to be desired – indeed, perhaps only computers are capable of comparable incompetence3 – but that 
is not our concern here.  Rather, a few hours’ research on this topic reveals the quite remarkable fact 
that, aside from the occasional mention in case law, no consideration of the legal basis of the Order 
of Australia or of the opportunities to improve its legal underpinnings has ever been published.  This 
article will commence therefore by filling that gap. 
 
 
                                                             
1 In order to avoid tedious repetition, in this article Damehoods are taken to be included within this term. 
2 Thus, for example, a scholar of the Australian honours system, writing in the previous year, did not see it 
coming, despite the foreseeable election of the Abbott government in that year : Fox, “‘A Pernicious System of 
Caste and Privilege’ : Egalitarianism and Official Honours in Australia, New Zealand and Canada” (2013) 10:2 
History Australia 202. 
3 According to Greg Sheridan, “Loyal to a Fault : Why Philip was Knighted” in “The Australian”, 16 September 
2015, p. 1 – writing only a couple of days after Mr Abbott lost the prime ministership – the decision to confer a 
Knighthood upon Prince Philip (rather than the initial decision to reintroduce Knighthoods in the first place) 
was ‘Tony Abbott’s worst mistake as Prime Minister’ and had ‘cruelled the morale of the Liberal Party’.  That 
writer goes on to state that The Queen herself had asked for this honour to be conferred upon her husband, a 
claim which has never been denied and is generally thought plausible (although not by Patrick, Credlin & Co. : 
How the Abbott Government Destroyed Itself (Black, Carlton 2016), p. 115) – and cf. also what Dr Christopher 
McCreery M.V.O. says about a comparable proposal at fn 94 below. 
John Wanna, “Political Chronicles” (2015) 61 Aust Jo Pol & Hist 618, 619 rightly sees this incident as the ‘final 
straw’ among numerous instances where Mr Abbott had made decisions without sufficient consultation with 
his colleagues.  It is also noticeable that the issue of “Political Chronicles” a year earlier, for the period when 
Knighthoods were originally restored ((2014) 60 Aust Jo Pol & Hist 621), does not even mention the topic.  On 
the mild public reaction to the resuscitation of Knighthoods as such (2014) compared to the Prince Philip deci-
sion (2015), see also Patrick, supra, pp. 106-116. 
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2.  The legal basis of the Order of Australia 
 
a.  The Royal prerogative 
 
Traditionally the source of power to make awards of honours is found in the Royal prerogative.4  To 
some extent the question of the legal source of this power may seem superfluous, given that the 
conferral of an award can be made by anyone without the need for an express power to do so.  For 
example, a national daily newspaper in this country annually anoints a person of its choice as “Aus-
tralian of the year” without any mandate from anyone to do so.  Numerous other awards made by 
private or semi-private organisations exist.  Universities confer honorary doctorates and declare staff 
members to be champion teachers of the year and so on.  Learned societies declare that their fellows 
are entitled to use post-nominals.  At the risk of ridicule, anyone could create their own order of 
knighthood along those of the Papacy, the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of Saint John of Je-
rusalem5 and its Continental branches and the orders of various deposed Royal families.6  There are 
of course also various foreign awards of legitimate states.7  It could be argued that the Crown, by 
making awards, is simply doing what any body of persons, or indeed any individual person could do, 
                                                             
4 The point, for obvious reasons, comes up infrequently, but see, for example, Council of Civil Service Unions v. 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 418; McKeown/Thomson, “Sources of Law and the U.K. Honours 
System” [2012] SLT 81, 81. 
5 For the recent notice in the official gazette of this Order’s conferral of the title of Dame of Grace on the Gov-
ernor of New South Wales, see Commonwealth of Australia Gazette,4 March 2019, C2019G00215.  The Order 
of Australia’s founder would not be amused by such indulgences as the commandeering of the official gazette 
by this Order : Whitlam Q.C., The Truth of the Matter (2nd ed., Melbourne U.P. 2006), p. 233. 
6 Robson (ed.), Who’s Who in Australia (55th ed., A.A.P. Directories, Southbank 2018), p. 63, contains a warning 
about purchased or self-conferred titles, ‘an intriguing eccentricity but a distraction for the compilers of Who’s 
Who in Australia.  The titles show some ingenuity, for example the “Order of Bountiful Endeavours” with the 
initials O.B.E.’ 
In R v. Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1, one of the convicted accused was Sir Thomas Graham Fry, “Sir” being just an-
other given name. See also Walsh v. Registrar, Supreme Court of Norfolk Island [2018] FCA 1075. 
7 There are Guidelines concerning the Acceptance and Wearing of Foreign Honours and Awards by Australians 
(approved by Her Majesty The Queen in August 2012), published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 
12 October 2012, no. S159 (C2012G00060).  Except for persons employed by the government, the precise legal 
basis of these guidelines may be questioned, although they have long been issued in the United Kingdom also.  
Those published in the London Gazette, 22 May 1914, p. 4116 give no other source for their validity besides 
‘the King’s wish’.  The first Australian issue of such guidelines was in 1989 : Review of Australian Honours and 
Awards, A Matter of Honour : the Report of the Review of Australian Honours and Awards (A.G.P.S., Canberra 
1995), p. 47. 
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and thus the power is not a prerogative one.  The better view is that powers shared with subjects are 
not prerogative powers.8 
 
Such reasoning would, however, overlook the fact – and I believe this is not circular – that it is only 
the Crown’s awards that claim to be made on behalf of the state, which in this case of course is the 
Australian state.  It is true to say that only the Crown can make awards on behalf of the national 
community of which we are all members whether we like it or not.  Therefore, the Crown’s power to 
make awards has a special nature which is not shared with, for example, a newspaper’s legal right to 
announce distinctions of its own invention. 
 
It is, moreover, right and proper – indeed, it is an aspect of the rule of law – that every action by the 
state should be referable to some source of power.  This principle is also promoted by decisions such 
as Williams v. Commonwealth (No. 1).9  Our enquiry about the Crown’s power to make awards and 
institute orders is therefore not an idle one.  The traditional answer referring to the common-law 
prerogative power is quite a suitable one for another reason : pinning various baubles on to people’s 
clothing and their subsequent adoption of assorted post-nominals or the title “Sir” or “Dame” are 
harmless – not, indeed, to prime ministers, to whom they can be politically fatal, but in a more strictly 
legal sense : no-one is threatened with deprivation of life, liberty or property as a result of such ac-
tions.  Indeed, it is perfectly legal, of course, to leave out the post-nominals or to refuse to refer to a 
titled person by the title “Sir” or “Dame”, and indeed the writer recalls seeing advocacy of such action 
during the brief second coming of Australian Knighthoods. 
 
However, despite its general inoffensiveness and antiquity this state of the law has been doubted in 
recent times.  The motives for these doubts may be legal nationalism or a desire for textual fidelity, or 
both, for the suggestion made by French C.J., Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. in Kline v. Official Secretary 
to the Governor-General10 is that ‘[t]he grant of honours, once regarded as part of the prerogative of 
the Crown, is now encompassed in the executive power conferred by s 61’ of the federal Constitution.  
                                                             
8 See for example Williams v. Commonwealth (No. 1) (2012) 248 CLR 156, 344; Taylor, The Constitution of Vic-
toria (Federation, Leichhardt 2006), p. 101; Tomkins, “The Authority of Entick v. Carrington” in Entick v. Car-
rington : 250 Years of the Rule of Law (Hart, Oxford 2015), p. 173. 
9 (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
10 (2013) 249 CLR 645, 653.  On this case, see Cremean, “Orders of Australia” (2011) 19 Aust Jo Admin Law 7. 
5 
 
While thus enjoying a majority of the High Court of Australia in its favour, this dictum was not neces-
sary to the decision in the case and may therefore be regarded as obiter.  The nature of the suggestion 
is also unclear : at first it could be read as stating that the Crown’s prerogative has been superseded 
wholly or in part by the powers conferred by s 61.  One difficulty with that theory would be knowing 
which powers, formerly of the prerogative, are ‘now encompassed in the executive power conferred 
by s 61’.  The only way of doing so would be to refer to lists of long-recognised prerogative powers 
again, rendering this exercise rather pointless.11  Thus, if the power to provide honours is now within 
s 61, this must be because it was previously a prerogative power.  The bottle would have the same 
contents with only its label changed. 
 
One does not need to believe in the common law as truly the ultimate constitutional foundation to 
question whether this is necessary or achieves anything much : just as much fidelity to the text can be 
obtained in other ways.  Thus, only a few years earlier in Cadia Holdings v. New South Wales,12 Gum-
mow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ. declared that s 61 ‘includes the prerogative powers accorded 
the Crown by the common law’ – a preferable position which avoids the objection just raised while 
achieving just as much fidelity to the text and autochthony.  Indeed, French C.J. seems to have refined 
his position in the direction stated, for we find his Honour in “C.P.C.F.” v. Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection13 stating : 
 
The history of the prerogative powers in the United Kingdom informs consideration of the 
content of s 61, but should not be regarded as determinative.  The content of the executive 
power may be said to extend to the prerogative powers, appropriate to the Commonwealth, 
accorded to the Crown by the common law.14 
 
 
                                                             
11 Zines, “The Common Law in Australia : its Nature and Constitutional Significance” (2004) 32 Fed LR 337, 348.  
For an in-depth discussion of this matter not limited to the context of honours, see Gerangelos, “The Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth of Australia : Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, ‘Nationhood’ and 
the Future of the Prerogative” (2012) 12 Ox U Clth LJ 97, 105-112. 
12 (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226; and see at 228 [94]. 
13 (2015) 255 CLR 514. 
14 At 538.  Kiefel J., in dissent, deals inconclusively with this question at 595; at 654, Keane J. assumes that ‘pre-




One further objection to abandoning the idea of the prerogative exists.  An important feature of the 
prerogative was its vulnerability to displacement by statute.  If formerly prerogative powers are now 
regarded as conferred by s 61, could they be altered or abolished only by amending the Constitution?  
Given the various amendments to the statutes of the Order of Australia made during its forty-five-
year life, would it be “frozen” at some point and if so at which point?  Or would only the powers 
themselves be part of s 61 and not the precise manifestation of them in prerogative instruments of 
various sorts?  This, in the end, would probably raise a question of the level of generality at which the 
prerogative powers had achieved constitutional status.  In our field, the sorts of questions that would 
be raised by a constitutionalised prerogative can be simply illustrated : would s 61 incorporate only 
some power to create an honours system of any sort, or would the executive’s power to confer Knight-
hoods be included within the power conferred by s 61 and thus beyond Parliament’s reach?  Can the 
executive’s power to confer Knighthoods be finally abolished only by amending the Constitution? 
 
This is not a theoretical question : one response to the knighting of Prince Philip was a proposal for a 
private member’s Bill preventing the award of further Knighthoods.  Its proponent, Dr Andrew Lam-
ing M.P. from the Liberal Party, is said in a newspaper report to have received the following advice on 
it from Professor George Williams A.O. : 
 
It avoids constitutional problems because it does not seek to rewrite the executive instru-
ments, notably the Letters Patent, but merely sets down in legislation a standard indicating 
that it is unlawful for future appointments of this kind [i.e. Knighthoods] to be made by the 
executive. 
 
It is well accepted that Parliament may regulate the exercise of executive power of this kind.15 
 
Indeed it is, and that is because a common-law prerogative power is involved, not a power conferred 
directly by s 61.  In fact it is open to Parliament, should it so desire, to go much further by repealing 
the Letters Patent entirely16 and providing that no honours system should ever be created again – as 
                                                             
15 Rosie Lewis, “M.P. says Knights Kill Bill ‘Fundamentally Flawed’”, “The Australian”, 6 February 2015, p. 4. 
16 Cf. Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.) s 9F. 
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Parliament cannot bind itself, this would not prevent any future statutory resuscitation, but would 
remove the prerogative power until the statute was repealed.  Alternatively, Parliament could provide 
its own legislation for an honours system coupled with a provision that the Royal prerogative to create 
honours should not be exercisable in future.  As long as the prerogative powers continue and are 
merely recognised, but not completely replaced by s 61 there is no possible constitutional objection 
to any such course.  Indeed, it may be preferable to enact a statute – a question to which I shall return.  
At any rate, Parliament retains the final say, if it chooses to have it, over a prerogative power to confer 
honours that fits within s 61 but is antecedent to it. 
 
b.  Federal aspects of the prerogative 
 
What I have written so far assumes that honours do fall within federal legislative and executive power.  
This would seem to be a fairly uncontroversial position. 
 
That does not imply that the States also do not have such power.  Indeed, the better view is that they 
do, merely leaving it largely unexercised.17  It seems intuitively obvious, however, that the federal level 
of government must also partake of the honours prerogative.  According to former Justice Ken 
                                                             
17 Taylor, above n 8 at 107-109.  It is therefore unnecessary to consider quasi-theological questions about the 
(in)divisibility of the Crown of Australia in this field : they have even less practical significance than usual.  Fur-
thermore, the example of Canada shows that federal and local honours could happily co-exist. 
In the 1970s a federal veto over a proposed State honours system seems to have been successfully imple-
mented on the ground that ‘Royal warrants in such matters are issued on the recommendations of Prime Min-
isters alone’ (Whitlam Q.C., The Whitlam Government 1972 – 1975 (Viking, Ringwood 1985), p. 140), but any 
comparable modern federal advice to The Queen to frustrate the creation of a State honours system would be 
neatly parried by a reminder that Her Majesty’s powers relating to the States now cannot usually be exercised 
by her anyway (s 7 (2) and (4) of the Australia Act 1986 (Imp. & Clth)). 
The Review of Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 219, refers mysteriously to interest in some States 
in creating their own system of awards.  Evidently nothing came of these proposals, but that was not for want 
of any legal power. 
Below it will be proposed that the Order of Australia should be established by federal Act of Parliament instead 
of prerogative instrument.  This, if it were done, might raise the issue whether State honours could be ruled 
out under such legislation using s 109 of the Constitution (which would appear inapplicable to legislation of the 
Commonwealth that is not parliamentary but made under the prerogative).  Little space should be devoted to 
this doubly hypothetical possibility, but my view in brief is that this could not be done : there could be no di-
rect inconsistency, and as far as covering the field is concerned federal laws would be awards for federal pur-
poses made by the federal polity, while State awards would be awards for State purposes made by the State.  
Nor could a naked prohibition of State awards be enacted federally for the reasons explored by Mr N. Dour 
and me in “Manufactured Inconsistency” (2013) 39 Mon ULR 131.  However, much more time and effort would 
be needed for a proper examination of this possibility if it ever became a reality. 
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Hayne A.C., the power to create national awards is a necessary consequence of the Commonwealth’s 
establishment as a polity and thus able to be conceded to the federal executive as no undue enhance-
ment of its powers18 – although it is noticeable that his former Honour both deprecates argument by 
assertion in this field and here provides an example of it, for he neither provides a criterion of necessity 
nor considers, despite his own strictures, why it is necessary for the executive rather than Parliament 
to possess the power to create awards (not confer individual awards, which could indeed hardly be 
done by the legislature). 
 
As far as federal legislative power is concerned, the nature of the prerogative as always vulnerable to 
parliamentary adjustment or extinction means that, if a prerogative power is exercisable by the fed-
eral executive, it can be regulated or abolished also by the Federal Parliament.  This is not reasoning 
backwards from a desired conclusion : it is a matter of basic constitutional principle – no action of the 
executive can possibly fall outside the purview of Parliament, and prerogative powers exist only at its 
sufferance.  Furthermore, if it is desired to locate one there is an obvious home for the honours system 
among federal powers : the nationhood power.  The honours system is one of ‘the symbols of nation-
hood [such as] a flag or anthem’.19  Virtually every country in the world has an honours system of some 
sort.20  Its absence from the Australian scene would be odd indeed – it would be even odder to find 
not merely a national honours system absent, but also that one could not possibly be created, even 
by federal Parliament. 
 
Nevertheless Professor Anne Twomey, among others, has cogently criticised the looseness of the rea-
soning behind declarations that this or that federal function can be justified under the nationhood 
power and adds wittily, ‘[t]here is no reason to fear that we would be flagless or anthemless in the 
absence of a nationhood power’.21  The present author, who would incidentally welcome rather than 
fear the disappearance of the present National Anthem’s dismal doggerel, has also always doubted 
the need for the nationhood power and the justification for inserting another unwritten power into 
                                                             
18 “Executive Power” (2017) 28 PLR 236, 246f.  See also “C.P.C.F.”, (2015) 255 CLR 514, 565. 
19 Davis v. Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 111. 
20 Apparently Ireland is the only or the major exception, and if so it may well be the exception that proves the 
rule, for according to their Lordships in Re Earl of Antrim’s Petition [1967] 1 AC 691, 716, 719 Ireland has 
simply ceased to exist (and therefore can no longer be represented in the House of Lords), making its lack of an 
honours system readily explicable.  Perhaps another exception is Sweden, which has not abolished its honours 
system but has awarded honours for some decades only to foreigners and members of its royal family. 
21 “Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and Nationhood Powers” (2010) 34 
MULR 313, 336. 
9 
 
s 51’s extremely long and thorough list, clearly intended to be complete, of federal powers.  If there 
is anything that can be justified as an example of the nationhood power, it is an honours system, but 
it is also sufficient simply to say that as there is a prerogative executive power to create an honours 
system there must also be a parliamentary power to regulate and even to abolish it.  If it is desired to 
find a home for this parliamentary power on the list in s 51 rather than using the nationhood power, 
it may be recalled that it is certainly an incident of the prerogative, and thus perhaps a ‘matter[] inci-
dental’ to it within the meaning of s 51 (xxxix), that it is always amenable to parliamentary control. 
 
c.  The Letters Patent and other formal documents 
 
As a valid exercise of prerogative power by the Crown, Letters Patent create the Order of Australia 
and provide a constitution for it.  It is interesting to observe at this point that the initial and subsequent 
amending Letters Patent have always been issued by Her Majesty The Queen, not by the Governor-
General.  They are countersigned by the Prime Minister, thus indicating their federal source. 
 
A booklet containing the Letters Patent and updated constitution of the Order as well as the ordi-
nances (of which more anon) is published on the Governor-General’s web site.22  The Order’s consti-
tution is also published with all amendments incorporated by the federal Office of Parliamentary 
Counsel using the Federal Register of Legislation and the same format that is used for federal Acts of 
Parliament;23 the ordinances may be found there as well.  Letters Patent are primary (i.e. not dele-
gated) legislative instruments that are not to be found among the Acts of Parliament because they are 
issued by the executive pursuant to its remnant of prerogative power.  Instead each amendment to 
the Order’s constitution is published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette and also, under the 
otherwise barely used title “other — prerogative instruments”, on the on-line Federal Register of Leg-
islation.24 
                                                             
22 The booklet also includes a picture of The Queen, a message from the Governor-General, pictures of the Or-
der’s insignia, a brief introduction and a list of contact persons.  At the time of writing it could be found at 
https://www.gg.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-09/PRINT%20FINAL%20Order%20of%20Australia%20Book-
let%20OOSGG.PDF. 
23 At the time of writing the latest version was compilation no. 16, Register i.d. C2018Q00016 on the Federal 
Register of Legislation. 
24 Presumably the legal basis for this registration is the catch-all ability to register anything useful in ss 15G (5) 
& 15H (2) of the Legislation Act 2003 (Clth).  As solely a prerogative power is involved here, instruments relat-




As the Letters Patent and constitution are thus freely available, this is not a general history of the 
Order of Australia25 and many of its most important features will be considered in detail below, I shall 
confine myself to an overview of the structure of the Order’s legal documents.  The Order’s constitu-
tion is set out in the Schedule to the Letters Patent, dated 14 February 1975 and counter-signed by 
one E.G. Whitlam Q.C. as Prime Minister.  Her Majesty used, of course, the new Royal style and titles 
conferred upon her under the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Clth)26 – making it clear that she was 
acting as Queen of Australia.  The Letters Patent recited that ‘it is desirable that there be established 
an Australian society of honour for the purpose of according recognition to Australian citizens and 
other persons for achievement or for meritorious service’ and thereupon established ‘a society of 
honour to be known as the “Order of Australia”’.27  The constitution of the Order was annexed as a 
Schedule to the Letters Patent.  While the body of the Letters Patent has never been amended, the 
Schedule containing the constitution has been amended sixteen times since 1975.  Such amendments 
are also made by Letters Patent issued by Her Majesty.  The body of the Letters Patent of 1975 contain 
no numbered clauses; the constitution in the Schedule contains numbered items up to thirty-one.  As 
with a statute, these are designated as “sections” within the constitution itself and they are divided 
into what are also called by the statutory terms of sub-sections, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs. 
 
At the same time as the Order of Australia was created, Letters Patent were also issued reciting that 
‘it is desirable that there be instituted certain Australian decorations for the purpose of according 
recognition to Australian citizens and other persons who perform acts of bravery’ and creating the 
Cross of Valour, the Star of Courage, the Bravery Medal and the Commendation for Brave Conduct.28  
In contrast to the Order of Australia, no formal society of honour was created by these Letters Patent.  
Since then various other decorations and awards have been created under the prerogative power by 
Royal Letters Patent, such as the Public Service Medal29 and the Distinguished Service Cross, Medal 
                                                             
para. (b) of the definition of “power delegated by the Parliament” in s 4, which embraces only those preroga-
tive instruments that are also authorised by an Act of Parliament. 
25 There is no full-scale history of the Order.  One useful substitute is Hazell, “The Australian Honours System : 
An Overview” in Jackson (ed.), Honouring Commonwealth Citizens : Proceedings of the First Conference on 
Commonwealth Honours and Awards (Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, Toronto 2007), ch. 2. 
26 The Act gave Parliament’s assent to the new style and titles, which were then adopted by Royal proclama-
tion : Australian Government Gazette, 19 October 1973, p. 5. 
27 Australian Government Gazette, 17 February 1975, no. S28 (C2010Q00031). 
28 Australian Government Gazette, 17 February 1975, no. S28 (C2010Q00056). 
29 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 28 November 1989, no. S369 (C2010Q00075). 
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and commendation.30  A special case was constituted by the Victoria Cross for Australia,31 continuing 
a well-known earlier distinction of the highest rank.  None of these awards will be considered further 
here. 
 
Subordinate legislation, known as ordinances, can also be made under s 30 of the Order of Australia’s 
constitution.  That section, drafted very much on the model of a statutory power to make regulations, 
gives power to the Governor-General to make ordinances for general purposes and for five named 
purposes : ‘the government of the order’, its insignia, the designations of the members, investitures 
and terminations or cancellations of awards.32  At the time of writing ordinances existed on all these 
topics.  Good examples germane to the present topic are paragraphs (a) and (b) of regulation 3 of the 
Designations and Insignia Ordinance33 – again the items are designated in accordance with legislative 
conventions, here those applicable to regulations.  Those paragraphs provide that a Knight or Dame 
of the Order may use the title “Sir” or “Dame” and the post-nominals “A.K.” or “A.D.” as well as wear-
ing the prescribed insignia.  These are in turn prescribed under reg. 7 of the Insignia Ordinance.34  The 
same two ordinances also prescribe designations and insignia for the other ranks of the Order. 
 
Recently a further section, 30A, permitting ordinances to be made has been added to the Order’s 
constitution;35 it explicitly requires, unlike s 30,36 the Prime Minister’s recommendation.  The sole 
topic of ordinances made under s 30A is the quotas – the yearly number of appointments at each level 
in the general division (not the military division) of the Order, previously dealt with in the constitution 
itself.  According to the Governor-General’s annual report, 
 
The changes ensure an ongoing efficient mechanism that enables the quotas to be varied in 
response to changing circumstances in Australia.  The Ordinance subsequently made on 19 
                                                             
30 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 4 February 1991, no. S25 (C2010Q00026). 
31 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 4 February 1991, no. S25 (C2010Q00025). 
32 As s 25 (2) (c) & (d) of the Order’s constitution makes clear, this is simply a difference in wording : all awards 
except that of the Medal of the Order are terminated; the award of the Medal is cancelled. 
33 Federal Register of Legislation, C2010Q00045. 
34 Federal Register of Legislation, C2010Q00080. 
35 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 24 April 2018, C2018G00297. 
36 Again, if it were an Act in question, s 16A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Clth) would imply a require-
ment that the Governor-General must act with the advice of the Executive Council under s 30, but that section 
does not apply to prerogative instruments. 
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April 2018[37] maintained the current quotas, with the exception of the Member of the Order 
of Australia (A.M.), which was increased by 25 in a calendar year.  (The current quota is now 
365.)  There remains no annual quota on the Medal (O.A.M.).38 
 
Enhancing flexibility is the usual reason why a matter might be moved from the primary legislation 
(here issuing from Buckingham Palace, usually made by Parliament) to delegated legislation (here, as 
is often so, issued from Yarralumla). 
 
Honours policy is, as we shall see, quite properly a matter for the Prime Minister, Cabinet and the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (which has an Honours and Symbols Section).  How-
ever, the Department has informed the author that it does not provide advice to the Governor-Gen-
eral’s office on the ordinances to be made under s 30, taking the view that the administration of the 
order in these respects is a matter for that office.  Only on the topic dealt with in s 30A is such advice 
provided.39  Of course, The Queen always acts on governmental advice when making amendments to 
the Order’s constitution.  Thus the effect of the new s 30A, in moving the setting of quotas from the 
Order’s constitution to ordinances requiring prime ministerial advice, is that governmental advice on 
that topic will henceforth be provided to the Governor-General not The Queen.  Evidently it was 
thought that the government should retain its accustomed role in determining the quotas and the 
matter was not confided to the Governor-General alone. 
 
                                                             
37 Constitution of the Order of Australia (Number of Appointments in the General Division) Ordinance 2018 
(Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 27 April 2018, C2018G00302), which was countersigned by the Prime 
Minister given the requirement for the Prime Minister’s recommendation in s 30A.  After this article was ac-
cepted for publication, however, the quotas were changed by the Constitution of the Order of Australia (Num-
ber of Appointments in the General Division) Ordinance 2019 (Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 3 April 
2019, C2019G00308) without any indication of the Prime Minister’s approval of the Ordinance. 
38 Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor-General, Annual Report 2017-18 (The Office, Canberra 2018), 
p. 40.  Letters Patent had last changed the quotas two years earlier, in 2016 : Commonwealth of Australia Ga-
zette, 11 October 2016, C2016G01347. 
39 Unsigned e-mail from the source stated to the author, 15 February 2019. 
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d.  Her Majesty or His Excellency? 
 
Earlier, the somewhat out-of-the-way topic of a State honours system was briefly mentioned.  Should 
such a thing ever be created, under s 7 (2) and (4) of the Australia Act 1986 (Imp. & Clth) it could be 
done only by the Governor unless The Queen were personally present in the State and able to exercise 
the Royal powers in person.  Otherwise all State prerogative powers, like all Royal powers relating to 
a State except the appointment of a Governor, must be exercised by the Governor.40 
 
For some reason care has been taken to adopt the opposite approach at federal level.  As we have just 
seen, while the subordinate rules of the Order, the ordinances, are made by the Governor-General, 
and one particular topic – the quotas – has just been removed from the Palace’s and added to the 
Governor-General’s own authority (with prime ministerial recommendation), the Order was created 
by Letters Patent issued by The Queen and all amendments to its constitution since have proceeded 
from the same source.  Is the reason some sort of legal impediment to the Governor-General’s taking 
action alone, or is it merely a question of tradition and perceived prestige along with the fact that The 
Queen is also Sovereign of the Order?  (The position within the Order held by the Governor-General 
is Chancellor and Principal Knight or Companion.41  It is also worth noting that appointments to the 
Order are made, according to s 9 of the Order’s constitution, ‘with the approval of the Sovereign, by 
Instrument signed by the Governor-General’.  This wording has not changed since 1975 but the Keat-
ing government ended the practice by which proposed awards were presented to Her Majesty for her 
approval; now she merely receives information about awards after the fact.)42 
 
                                                             
40 Despite this, a delegation of power to permit the retention of the title “Honourable” to State Governors is 
recorded by Twomey, Constitution of New South Wales (Federation, Leichhardt 2004), p. 153.  This was clearly 
unnecessary, but it may have been done merely out of caution or because it was thought that titles conferred 
by Her Majesty should continue to be under her personal supervision.  See further below, fn 151. 
41 Section 2 (1), (1A), (1B) of its constitution. 
42 Smith, “The Australian Honours System in the Beginning” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Conference of 
the Samuel Griffith Society Mercure Melbourne, August 2014 : Upholding the Australian Constitution Volume 
Twenty-Six (The Society, Melbourne 2016), p. 76; Review of Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 24, 
300 (exception for the Victoria Cross, which is not part of the Order).  It is also noticeable that announcements 
of awards no longer refer to Her Majesty The Queen’s gracious approval of the awards, but merely begin : ‘The 
Governor-General is pleased to announce the following appointments and awards’.  The changes on this front 
are traced by Martin, “Perspectives on the Honours of Australia” in Jackson (ed.), above n 25 at 57. 
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It is doubtless true that, in colonial times, Vice-Regal officers could not have exercised the prerogative 
power to create honours.  Even in this field, however, in Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee year the 
Privy Council affirmed, in obiter dicta, the capacity of the Crown, in combination with a colonial legis-
lature (i.e. through Act of a colonial legislature), to create honours : ‘even in the case of titles of hon-
our’, their Lordships stated, ‘it does not appear to be doubtful that the Sovereign may, with the assis-
tance of an Act of the Legislature, exercise the prerogative in a manner which would but for its provi-
sions be unconstitutional’.43  While they went on to give an example involving the Westminster Par-
liament, namely the creation of life peerages for the law lords by statute, the remainder of the judg-
ment indicates that they also thought colonial legislatures capable of working similar constitutional 
wonders.  Nevertheless, without the backing of a local Act of Parliament it is almost certainly correct 
to say that a nineteenth-century colonial Governor without an express delegation authorising him to 
do so could not have created a local honours system.44  It is even more certain that such a Governor 
would have faced a severe reprimand from the Colonial Office and possible recall. 
 
Nowadays, however, as Barwick C.J. rightly pointed out in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case,45 we 
have, thanks to s 61 of the federal Constitution, a Governor-General who is ‘in truth a Viceroy’ capable 
of exercising every Royal power appertaining to the federal Australian government.  This must include 
the prerogative of honours, and H.E. Renfree C.B.E.46 is therefore correct to say that the retention of 
this power by Buckingham Palace ‘is a matter of comity rather than of strict law, and there is no reason 
why honours should not be granted by the Governor-General as The Queen’s representative on the 
advice of Australian ministers and without even consulting the Sovereign’.  That must apply both to 
individual awards and to the setting up of the entire system, and the only thing to add is that the 
involvement of The Queen is not merely a matter of ‘comity’ but would also, in the eyes of some at 
least, elevate the prestige of the Order.  There seems no good reason to do without that effect apart 
from convenience. 
 
                                                             
43 Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario) [1898] AC 247, 252. 
44 Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (2nd ed., Longmans Green, London 1894), p. 313.  
Further statements to the same or a similar effect are collected and criticised in Evatt, The Royal Prerogative 
(Law Book, North Ryde [1924] 1987), pp. 115f.  For an interesting exchange of views on this question, see 
Moore, George Higinbotham and Eureka : The Struggle for Democracy in Colonial Victoria (Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, North Melbourne 2018), p. 277. 
45 (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373. 
46 The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, Sydney 1984), p. 511. 
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If it ever were desired to do without involvement from London, caution would nevertheless suggest a 
delegation of the power to the Governor-General to amend the Letters Patent, or some amendment 
to them having the same effect, in order to prevent any argument that the stream has attempted to 
rise above its source.  Such action was recommended by the Review of Australian Honours and Awards 
in 1995, except in relation to new awards which, the committee thought, should still be approved by 
the Sovereign as fount of honour.47  It may also be noted that the Order’s constitution has contained 
since 1975, in s 10, the following provision : 
 
10.  Nothing in this Constitution limits the right of the Governor-General to exercise all powers 
and authorities of the Sovereign in respect of the Order. 
 
This is somewhat reminiscent of s 51 (xxxviii) of the federal Constitution and supports the approval of 
all honours by the Governor-General rather than The Queen48 which the Keating government intro-
duced.49  But as it stands it does not allow the Governor-General to amend the constitution of the 
Order : it is not The Queen as Sovereign of the Order who amends its constitution, but The Queen qua 
Queen. 
 
Although s 61 of the Australian Constitution does not of course apply in Canada,50 the constitution of 
the Order of Canada is amended from Rideau Hall (Government House) in Ottawa, not Buckingham 
Palace.51  Yet it is curious to find that, in a related field, it was still thought necessary to delegate 
powers to the Canadian Governor-General : when the Canadian Heraldic Authority was to be set up, 
the initial step was for The Queen to delegate to the Governor-General of Canada ‘all powers and 
authorities lawfully belonging to Us as Queen of Canada in respect of the granting of armorial bearings 
                                                             
47 Above n 6 at 301. 
48 Hazell, above n 25 at 47. 
49 See above, n 42. 
50 In Canada, there is a general delegation in cl. II of the Letters Patent published in Canada Gazette, Part I, 1 
October 1947, p. 3104.  Curiously it is followed by a number of specific delegations of powers such as the 
power to dissolve Parliament and grant pardons.  Perhaps this is what caused the doubts about the heraldry 
powers. 
51 See, for example, Canada Gazette, Part I, 19 July 1997, p. 2087.  The initial establishment of the Order was 
by Her Majesty’s own Letters Patent, which indeed recited that ‘the establishment of the Order of Canada is 
properly of concern to Her Majesty as Queen of Canada and should be made only with Her Majesty’s personal 
approval’ (Canada Gazette, Part 1, 29 April 1967, p. 1249).  However, amendments from very early on have 
been made by the Governor-General. 
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in Canada’.52  However, this was probably unnecessary, and done solely for symbolic reasons and to 
avoid even the smallest grain of doubt based on the long-standing practice of deferring to the U.K. 
authorities in this field.53  In New Zealand also, the Royal prerogative of honours is exercised from 
Buckingham Palace for symbolic reasons and, in relation to the actual grant of honours, because that 
is what the relevant statutes of the orders concerned require.54 
 
 
                                                             
52 Canada Gazette, Part I, 11 June 1988, pp. 2227f. 
53 Agnew of Lochnaw, “The Conflict of Heraldic Laws” [1988] Juridical Review 61, 67 (different prerogative 
powers involved in various Realms); Cox, “The Office of the Chief Herald of Ireland and Continuity of Legal Au-
thority” (2007) 29 Dublin ULR 84, 96; Cox, “The Royal Prerogative in the Realms” (2007) 33 Clth Law Bull 611, 
629; Lordon Q.C., Crown Law (Butterworths, Toronto 1991), pp. 101f. 
54 Cox, “The Dichotomy of Legal Theory and Political Reality : the Honours Prerogative and Imperial Unity” 
(1999) 14 Aust Jo Law & Soc 15, 17, 22, 41. 
On heraldry powers in Australia, see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 Feb-
ruary 2018, p. 700, where the Prime Minister states, on advice of his Department, as follows : 
The practice of the College of Arms in England granting armorial bearings to Australians is well estab-
lished as one way Australians can obtain heraldic insignia if they wish to do so.  There is nothing pre-
venting any person or organisation from commissioning a local artist, graphics studio or heraldry spe-
cialist to design and produce a coat of arms or identifying symbol.  Those arms would have the same 
standing and authority in Australia as arms prepared by the College of Arms in England. 
This answer is a masterpiece of ambiguity, but implies that the College of Arms’ powers in this country are 
rated no higher than those of any private body or person in Australia.  It should be noted, however, that 
reg. 16 of the Insignia Ordinance of the Order of Australia deals with the accoutrements of grants of arms by 
Garter King of Arms to members of the Order. 
At https://www.college-of-arms.gov.uk, the College itself claims to be ‘the official heraldic authority for Eng-
land, Wales, Northern Ireland and much of the Commonwealth including Australia and New Zealand’.  The 
Australian Heraldry Society, which would like to see a local heraldic authority on the Canadian model, rejects 
this claim : http://www.heraldryaustralia.org/heraldic-authority. 
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3.  Knighthoods in the Order of Australia – the Abbott system 
 
a.  The Council of the Order of Australia 
 
Like much machinery of the Order of Australia, the Council for the Order of Australia was modelled 
upon the Advisory Council for the Order of Canada; the Order’s progenitor, the Hon. E.G. Whit-
lam A.C. Q.C., described its role as follows :55 
 
The most important difference between the Order of Australia and the Imperial honours is 
the method of selecting the recipients.  Imperial awards are made on the recommendations 
of politicians while the awards in the Order of Australia are made by the Council of the Order.  
Nominations may be made to the Council by any person or organisation including any govern-
ment or party or politician.  A politician can sponsor an award in the Order of Australia but no 
politician can decide that it will be given.  All representations are generated through the Coun-
cil and no award is made unless it is considered and recommended by the Council.56 
 
Some qualifications and additions are necessary to these broadly correct statements : under ss 9 and 
10 of the Order’s constitution awards are actually made, as we have seen, by the Governor-General, 
with the Sovereign's approval, now dispensed with; the role of the Council is not to make awards, but 
to consider recommendations to the Governor-General following nominations of citizens for awards 
and permanent residents for honorary awards.57  Accordingly, and secondly, other persons are ap-
pointed as honorary members to the Order without any recommendation of the Council – visiting or 
visited foreign dignitaries, for example, as honorary members.58  It is of course a long-standing inter-
national practice for such awards to be made during state and official visits, and the present Governor-
                                                             
55 On the historical links and differences between the two, see, for example, McCreery, The Order of Canada : 
Genesis of an Honours System (2nd ed., U. of Toronto Press, 2018), pp. 207f; Hazell, above n 25 at 40f; McCre-
ery, “Canada’s National Honours : An Assessment” in Jackson (ed.), above n 25 at 105; Whitlam Q.C., above n 
17 at 141f. 
56 Whitlam Q.C., above n 17 at 143. 
57 Constitution of the Order, s 5 (a), (b).  See further below, fn 77. 
58 Of course the founder of the Order, as he might well be styled, was aware of these refinements and indeed 




General holds several such awards from foreign countries.  There is, thirdly, also a different process 
for all awards in the military division of the Order.  Finally, although there was no formal system for 
doing so it was possible to nominate oneself or others for Imperial honours informally by contacting 
influential people or those thought to be influential. 
 
With these qualifications, the statements quoted are accurate – and the principal point is that the 
nomination process for the Order of Australia, being independent of political jobbery, favouritism and 
whim and based rather on an assessment of merit, is far superior to that for the former system; nom-
inating proposed recipients involves doing nihil obscure […], ut studia cupiditatesque honorum atque 
ambitiones ex omnibus civitatibus tolleret, quae res evertendae rei publicae solent esse.59  Indeed, in 
2006 Malcolm Hazell C.V.O.,60 Official Secretary to the Governor-General and Secretary of the Order, 
observed that ‘[i]n keeping with the apolitical nature of the awards system, by convention the Prime 
Minister and Premiers of State governments do not put forward nominations nor influence the pro-
cess’.61  (At least, that is the theory : heads of government can easily arrange for others to put forward 
names and then lobby Council members for them, and one former member of the Council reported in 
the mid-’90s lobbying by prime ministers and vetting of lists by premiers, presumably through their 
respective States’ representatives on the Council.62  Let us hope that such behaviour is a thing of the 
past.) 
 
Sir David Smith K.C.V.O., A.O. reports a previous occasion on which this system needed to be defended 
from the actions of the government.  In 1984 Cabinet, without consultation with or even notice to the 
Governor-General, approved a new system under which three-quarters of awards would have been 
given, instead, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and State Premiers, with only a quarter 
to be recommended by the Council as before.  The Premiers, if so minded, were then still able to make 
nominations for Imperial awards, and no doubt this proposal to give them a quota similar to that 
available for the Imperial awards was an attempt to bring them into the tent.  Curiously Sir David 
believes that if the Council had been abolished and all awards made politically there would have been 
                                                             
59 “nothing underhand, so as to take away from every city the zeal for and lusting after honours and distinc-
tions, phenomena which are wont to lead to the overturning of the state” : Cicero, In Verrem, 2.2.132.  What 
happens after nomination is nevertheless, and perhaps inevitably, not a model of transparency.  See below, fn 
97.  It is also the case that it is preferable for nominees not to be informed of their nomination, and to that ex-
tent it is done behind their backs, but this is not a requirement of the law. 
60 Now C.V.O., A.M. 
61 Above n 25 at 44. 
62 Review of Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 267. 
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nothing to object to, as that would simply have been a change in honours policy which is for the gov-
ernment to determine,63 but the mixed system proposed ‘would have destroyed the Order of Aus-
tralia’.64  At any rate, 
 
after consultation with the then Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs, who was chairman of the Coun-
cil for the Order of Australia, the then Governor-General and Chancellor of the Order, Sir Nin-
ian Stephen, went in to bat for the principle upon which the Order had been established.  He 
took the matter up with the Prime Minister and with the relevant minister, pointing out the 
consequences for the Order of what the Cabinet had done.  He also called in the minister’s 
departmental head and made him aware, in no uncertain terms, of the consequences of the 
bad advice which he and his department had given to Cabinet. 
 
Well, in due course, Cabinet rescinded its decision : the Prime Minister and State Premiers 
were not given their own honours quotas, and the Order continued to be administered by the 
Governor-General and his staff, free of ministerial and departmental control, with all recom-
mendations continuing to be made by an independent Council.65 
 
This was certainly a remarkable instance of advising, encouraging and warning. 
 
At this point it should be noted that the Chief Justice of High Court of Australia no longer chairs the 
Council after Brennan C.J. asked for this arrangement to end.  Although the equivalent body in Canada 
still is composed of Richard Wagner C.J. among others, in this country Brennan C.J. took the view that 
the separation of powers made it undesirable for him or any Justice of his Court to be on the Council.66  
                                                             
63 As is also stated by, for example, Hazell, above n 25 at 48. 
64 Smith, above n 42 at 79. 
65 Smith, above n 42 at 80.  See also Review of Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 55.  The Australian 
Archives’ catalogue contains, on a quick search, only one item which corresponds more or less to the infor-
mation given : A13979, 723, dated 14 June 1983 and entitled “Cabinet Decision 723 – Order of Australia – 
Without Submission”.  However, it was not available for public access at the time of writing.  Materials could 
also be in more general files such as M4520, 44.  These are tasks for the future general historian of the Order 
of Australia. 
66 Bonsey, The Order of Australia : Review 2011 (Government House, Canberra) 2011), p. 20 fn 11; Review of 
Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 50. 
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The change was made by Letters Patent in August 1996,67 less than eighteen months after Sir Gerard 
Brennan A.C., K.B.E. became Chief Justice.  The chairman (the word used in the Order’s constitution, 
s 4 (3)) is now appointed by the Governor-General from among the members – acting on the Prime 
Minister’s advice.68  The Council consists of the Vice-President of the Executive Council,69 the Chief of 
the Defence Force, a public servant involved in honours policy70 and sixteen governmental represent-
atives : eight are nominated by the Prime Minister and the others represent each of the eight States 
and Territories.71  It therefore has a total of nineteen members.  While, at the time of writing, the web 
site of the Council states that the Prime Minister’s nominees are ‘community representatives’,72 the 
constitution of the Order itself is silent about who, exactly, any of the governmentally appointed rep-
resentatives represent : the elected government?  The State as such – the polity?  The community in 
general?  This question is not an academic one, as is shown by the rumours just referred to according 
to which various politicians have attempted to guide the Council’s deliberations through their repre-
sentatives. 
 
There is no known case in which the Governor-General has declined to act upon a recommendation 
for an award made by the Council of the Order, or the Sovereign has refused approval to a proposed 
award before that function was removed from her, but as the process is secret we should not neces-
sarily expect to know.73  Nominations are made directly to the Governor-General by the Council with-
out the interposition of the government.74  Here then is another of those instances in which the Crown 
                                                             
67 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 16 August 1996, no. S303 (C2010Q000044). 
68 Hazell, above n 25 at 47, who additionally records that appointments to the Council are also made on advice.  
If the Order were established under an Act, s 18B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Clth) would authorise 
variation in the chairman’s title to accommodate holders who prefer the titles chair, chairwoman or chairper-
son.  No objection could possibly be taken to taking this step even without authorisation to do so, but here is 
an example of a slight quibble that could arise because of the unusual source of the Order’s constitutional ar-
rangements.  A more serious example is noted in the text below at n 117; another is noted above, n 36. 
69 Or, under s 4 (4) (a) of the Order’s constitution, ‘another member of the Federal Executive Council under 
summons [i.e. another Minister or parliamentary secretary] chosen, in accordance with arrangements made by 
the Governor‑General, to act in the member’s place as a member of the Council’. 
70 Under the Council Ordinance of 14 April 1983 (Federal Register of Legislation, C2009Q00096) this should be 
the secretary (permanent head) of the Department of the Special Minister of State.  Such a minister still exists 
but the eponymous Department has not for many years.  It may be that this Ordinance has been superseded 
by a later one which has not yet made it to the Federal Register of Legislation, although it is also printed in the 
booklet referred to above, fn 22; it seems likely therefore that the matter has been overlooked.  The present 
representative of the federal public service is Stephanie Foster P.S.M., Deputy Secretary, Governance Group, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
71 This securing of regional balance is a distinct strength of the Council also, which Canada’s equivalent body 
lacks : McCreery in in Jackson (ed.), above n 55 at 105. 
72 https://www.gg.gov.au/australian-honours-and-awardsorder-australia/council-order-australia 
73 See above, fn 10, for a case interpreting s 6A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Clth). 
74 Review of Australian Honours and Awards, above n 6 at 51. 
21 
 
is formally advised otherwise than by responsible ministers.  Is there a constitutional convention that 
that advice will be accepted?  Given that this advice is different from the “advice” proffered by minis-
ters responsible to the people through Parliament, its status is necessarily lower : it is not backed by 
the democratic choice of the people as those providing it have no democratic mandate.75  I suggest 
that the operation of the constitutional system of government in these circumstances does not require 
a constitutional convention to exist as a normative matter, and in the absence of information about 
whether the Council’s advice has ever been refused and the reasons for doing so such a convention 
should not be postulated as factual matter.  Nevertheless, the high status of the Council and the long 
history of general acceptance of its recommendations must make it rare for any of its recommenda-
tions for the conferral of awards to be rejected.76 
 
Under regs. 3 (2) (a) and 5 (5) of the Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance, the Council also ad-
vises the Governor-General upon the removal of awards in the general division.  However, reg. 3 (3) 
specifically provides that his Excellency may act on this front without the Council’s advice if it is ‘ap-
propriate to do so’.  Given the comparative rarity of removals, the seriousness of taking that step and 
the terms of reg. 3 (3), one would expect that the Governor-General would give independent consid-
eration to recommendations by the Council in this respect, although it would also be expected that 
they would, as a rule, be followed. 
 
b.  The second coming of Knighthoods – processes, procedures and principles 
 
In the first period during which Knighthoods in the Order of Australia were available (1976 – 1986) 
they were conferred via the usual process – the Council recommended Australian citizens (permanent 
                                                             
75 Cf. Twomey, “Advice to Vice-Regal Officers by Crown Law officers and Others” (2015) 26 PLR 193, 194, and, 
in relation to Canada, a similar point appearing in McCreery, above n 55 at 199-201. 
76 On this point an elaborate set of principles has been worked out in Canada : McCreery, above n 55 at 194-
202; McCreery, “Not the Governor-General’s Choice: Canadian Honours and the Butler-Pitfield Principles” 
(2019) 13 Jo Parl & Polit Law 67.  In Brian Platt & Marie-Danielle Smith, “Payette Calls Year 1 ‘Quite a Ride’ 
while Others See it as Turbulent”, “National Post” (Toronto), 12 January 2019, p. A7, it is reported that the pre-
sent Governor-General of Canada 
has continued to sit in on Order of Canada meetings to watch [the] Advisory Council deliberate on 
which Canadians should be recognised, despite honours experts and her own staff strongly advising 
against it. 
‘There continues to be micro-management and interference in the honours process […]’, one source 
familiar with the office said. 
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residents had not yet been added to its brief)77 and any honorary awards would have been handled 
by the government.  The only exception to these usual processes was the appointment of Charles 
Prince of Wales as a Knight in 1981, made by Letters Patent amending the constitution and conferring 
upon His Royal Highness precedence in the order immediately after the Governor-General78 (which 
could not have been done by any other method).  Nevertheless some indication of the Hawke govern-
ment’s anti-Knighthood stance must have been conveyed to the Council in some manner, for we find 
that no further Knighthoods were granted after the Queen’s Birthday list of 1983 until the level of 
Knighthood was officially removed in 1986.79  The Letters Patent doing so were, incidentally, remark-
able because they were issued by The Queen not ‘at our Court at St James’s’ in London, as is usual, 
but ‘at our Court at Government House, Canberra’ – it was Her Majesty's “Australia Acts” visit. 
 
On the resurrection of Knighthoods in 2014, the precedent of 1976 was ignored.  A new section, 8A, 
was added to the Order’s constitution : 
 
8A.  Appointments (including honorary appointments) to the Order as Knight or Dame shall 
be made, with the approval of the Sovereign on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, 
by Instrument signed by the Governor-General and sealed with the seal of the Order. 
 
In case this message was missed, the Council’s remit was changed to exclude specifically appointments 
of Knights, and s 19 (1) permitting members of the public to propose awards to the Council was also 
disapplied to the Knights.  It is also noticeable that a requirement for The Queen’s approval, long since 
dispensed with for the other ranks, was specifically mentioned in this new provision80 and in answer 
                                                             
77 That occurred in 2016 : Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 11 October 2016, C2016G01347. 
78 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 27 March 1981, no. S53 (C2010Q00036).  See further on this knotty 
point Commonwealth Senate, Finance and Public Administration Committee – Estimates, Debates, 23 February 
2015, p. 82.  This award, unlike that to his father a generation later, ‘created no fuss’ : Patrick, above n 3 at 
113. 
79 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 11 March 1986, no. S101 (C2010Q00037).  Sir Gordon Jackson, previ-
ously  A.C., was promoted to Knight of the Order in June 1983, after the election of the Hawke government.  
Presumably this was because the award had already been approved by The Queen and/or communicated to 
him before the change of government.  For a negative reaction to the removal of Knighthoods, see Fox/Furphy, 
“The Politics of National Recognition : Honouring Australians in a Post-Imperial World” (2017) 63 Aust Jo Pol & 
Hist 93, 102. 
80 Nevertheless, the announcement of the awards (not published in the Gazette) began : ‘The Governor-Gen-
eral is pleased to announce the following appointments and awards :’ (for example, 
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to a parliamentary question the Prime Minister stated that Her Majesty’s approval would be sought.81  
A limit of four Knighthoods per year was imposed, under s 11B; this did not include honorary appoint-
ments, and also did not include the Governor-General, who ex officio was to be the Principal Knight or 
Dame (s 2 (1) of the constitution).  The limit of four was only twice the number allowed in 1976, when 
the population was much smaller and Imperial awards including Knighthoods were still available. 
 
While self-restraint was evidently practised on that front, there was no public explanation of why the 
ordinary, time-honoured and best-practice process for the Order of Australia involving the independ-
ent Council had been bypassed for its highest and most prestigious level,82 nor was any legitimate 
reason obvious – to put it mildly.  Whether any latter-day Sir David Smith made any protest against 
the breach of the independence principle at the time must be left to revelations in decades hence, but 
opportunities for such rear-guard actions must have been limited because the idea was not taken to 
Cabinet.83  I do not suggest that Knighthoods themselves should have been the subject of bureaucratic 
attempts at blocking, for there may be legitimate differences of opinion on them and their re-intro-
duction affects no important politically neutral principle, but it would have perfectly legitimate for 
something to be done to defend the important principle of the independence of the Order from po-
litical interference. 
 
After the Prince Philip controversy, the constitution was amended, in accordance with a promise by 
the Prime Minister designed to limit the political damage to himself, to give the power to award 
Knighthoods to the Council, and s 8A in particular was repealed.84  However, no further appointments 
at this level were made before the change of leadership resulted in its complete abolition.85  The 
change to appointments by the Council would not, admittedly, have saved anyone from a further 
Philip-style blunder, for that award was made by the overriding method of amendments to the Order’s 
                                                             
http://old.gg.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/honours/qb/qb2014/Gazette%201%20Order%20of%20Aus-
tralia.pdf).  Cf. above, fn 42. 
81 Senate Question No. 350 of 2014. 
82 Senator Penny Wong’s Senate question no. 349 of 31 March 2014 asked why this method was chosen.  The 
answer provided did not state any reason, but merely that no further information would be given about advice 
tendered by the Prime Minister to The Queen. 
83 See below, fn 90. 
84 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 13 April 2015, C2015G00523.  in October 2019, Mr Abbott stated that 
it had been an error in the first place to give the power to award Knighthoods to the Prime Minister : Troy 
Bramston, “Turnbull’s Ambition was My Undoing, Says Abbott”, “The Australian”, 7 October 2019, p. 1. 
85 Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor-General, The Australian Honours and Awards Branch, Report 
2012-16 (The Office, Canberra 2016), p. 10. 
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constitution so that Prince Philip was not outranked within the Order by his own son, Prince Charles;86 
and, as the recipient was not an Australian or permanent resident, the appointment would even aside 
from that extraordinary procedure not have been made by the Council.  This belated change was how-
ever a recognition that an important principle of the Order of Australia had been breached and needed 
to be restored, as well as a serious reflection on the Prime Minister’s judgment.  Never, perhaps, has 
any decision, in itself trivial as this one was, better illustrated the need for consultation and frank 
debate within the government, given the extreme lack of proportion between the significance of the 
decision as a matter of world history and the enormous level of damage caused to the Prime Minister 
by it. 
 
Although he did promise in 2014 (before the Prince Philip debacle) to consult with the chairman of 
the Council before making recommendations for Knighthoods,87 the Prime Minister was not required 
by s 8A to consult anyone – recommendations apparently, based on the terms of s 8A, were to be 
made directly from him to The Queen.  The Governor-General and the chairman of the Council were 
consulted about the appointment of Prince Philip88 but apparently no-one else was consulted, and in 
particular no Cabinet ministers (or none who wished to own up to it after the event).  The Prime Min-
ister stated in Parliament merely that ‘[a]wards in the Order of Australia have never gone to Cabi-
net’89 – true in principle, but of course only because awards were usually handled by an independent 
Council!  (Admittedly this did not apply to honorary awards, but then we may ask : is it really true that 
Cabinet has never considered the question of honouring a particular distinguished foreigner who is 
about to visit or be visited?)  It would seem that the statement just quoted also means that no con-
sultation occurred, at least with Cabinet, in relation to the other appointments either – alongside the 
two Governors-General, whose appointments were ex officio, those of Professor the Hon. Dame Marie 
Bashir A.D., C.V.O. and Sir Angus Houston A.K., A.C. (Mil.), A.F.C. 
 
                                                             
86 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 30 January 2015, C2015G00155; Commonwealth Senate, Finance and 
Public Administration Committee – Estimates, Debates, 23 February 2015, p. 82.  For Prince Charles’s appoint-
ment by a similar method, see above, fn 78. 
87 Answer to Senator Penny Wong’s Senate question no. 350 of 31 March 2014, para. 5. 
88 Commonwealth Senate, Finance and Public Administration Committee – Estimates, Debates, 23 February 
2015, pp. 83, 91; 24 February 2015, pp. 5-7. 
89 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 February 2015, p. 888. 
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The restoration of Knighthoods itself, notoriously, as a “captain’s call” did not go to Cabinet, although 
Senator the Hon. George Brandis A.-G. Q.C. was consulted.90  When the decision was hurriedly made 
in 2015 to restore the Council’s role, it appears that this too was a “captain’s call” and the Governor-
General’s official secretary heard of the change when it was publicly announced by the Prime Minister.  
The Official Secretary to the Governor-General professed in public not to find this odd, given that 
honours policy was a matter for the government.91  That must of course be the case, given that advice 
is taken by the Governor-General on all manner of issues, some even arguably weightier than honours, 
and it is not for unelected Viceroys to run their own honours policy.92  There are also no honours in 
the personal gift of the Governor-General in Australia comparable to the Order of Merit or the Royal 
Victorian Order which are in the personal gift of The Queen as distinct from being conferred on some-
one’s “advice”.  Moreover, we have seen that Sir David Smith complained of an earlier failure to con-
sult – so it was not the only time Yarralumla’s consent had been assumed rather than obtained.  But 
it cannot be desirable to proceed thus; there is no harm in asking, and the day-to-day administrators 
of the honours system in Government House may conceivably have something useful to contribute.  
At all events, that possibility cannot be ruled out without asking them.  It is also required by plain 
ordinary courtesy.  Here, however, the circumstances of the appointment of Prince Philip followed by 
the public reaction and an imminent leadership challenge are no doubt largely to blame for the lack 
of consultation.  There was an urgent need to be seen to be doing something.  It was, nevertheless, 
noticeable that the abolition of Knighthoods under the Turnbull regime, admittedly not as urgent as 
doing something to calm down the “Sir Prince Philip” outcry, was accompanied by an elaborate 
demonstration that the matter had gone to Cabinet and been properly endorsed there.93 
 
 
                                                             
90 Errington/van Onselen, Battleground : Why the Liberal Party Shirtfronted Tony Abbott (Melbourne U.P., 
2015), p. 92; Hobbs, “Putting the ‘Queen’ Back into Queensland” (2014) 39 Alt LJ 9, 11.  It would seem that 
even the Governor-General may not have been consulted : Commonwealth Senate, Finance and Public Admin-
istration Committee – Estimates, Debates, 23 February 2015, pp. 87-90.  The letters released under F.O.I. laws 
referred to there may be found on the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s F.O.I. disclosure log web 
page under the number FOI/PMO/2014/012.  They are not particularly illuminating.  The background here, of 
course, is political allegations that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff was exercising too much power.  That is 
outside the scope of this article. 
91 Commonwealth Senate, Finance and Public Administration Committee – Estimates, Debates, 24 February 
2015, pp. 8f. 
92 This is also the case in Canada : McCreery, above n 55 at 201. 
93 See, for example, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-02/knights-and-dames-to-be-scrapped/6904474, 




4.  Comparisons and cases : Canada and New Zealand 
 
a.  Canada – honours and the Courts 
 
As noted earlier, the Order of Australia was established not as a copy, but on the model of the Order 
of Canada.  Prince Philip was appointed an Extraordinary Companion of the Order of Canada, its high-
est level, in 2013.94  No temptation to create Knighthoods in that Order appears ever to have seriously 
presented itself.95  While the Order of Canada’s history has hardly been entirely free of drama,96 there 
is perhaps one area in which Canada excels, and that is in the provision of case law following litigation 
on topics relating to the honours system.97 
 
The cases concern the important topic of the extent to which decisions relating to honours can be 
judicially reviewed.  In line with an obiter dictum in the House of Lords,98 in Black v. Chretien99 the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario held that decisions in the exercise of the prerogative of honours were 
beyond the review of the Courts.  The facts were somewhat unusual : the plaintiff, now Lord (Conrad) 
Black of Crossharbour, was in line for a British peerage which was blocked after objections raised by 
the Canadian Prime Minister, the defendant, with the British Prime Minister.100  Even though it was 
                                                             
94 Canada Gazette, Part I, 6 July 2013, p. 1766.  Sub-section 9 (2) of the Order’s Constitution provides, inter 
alia, that ‘a member of the Royal Family may be appointed as an extraordinary Companion, Officer or Mem-
ber’ : Canada Gazette, Part I, 20 July 2013, p. 1862.  Dr Christopher McCreery has advised me by e-mail that 
Prince Philip 
had first been nominated in 1967/68 and was only admitted after the issue of adding an extraordinary 
division to the Order was resolved (as part of the 2012 review I did of the national honours system for 
the Prime Minister’s Office and Privy Council Office).  When the appointments were announced great 
pains were gone to ensure that the world knew that H.R.H. had been nominated through the normal 
channels, and there was an actual citation attached.  In 1982 the then government offered to make 
H.R.H. a C.C. just for being the spouse of the Sovereign and Her Majesty patently refused. While 
H.R.H. was admitted as an extraordinary Companion and Commander, he was nominated and written 
up just like all the other members of the Order of Canada and Order of Military Merit -- and a detailed 
citation was published as to why he was getting it. 
95 McCreery in Jackson (ed.), above n 55 at 105. 
96 There is a general history in McCreery, above n 55. 
97 That is not to say that Australia has no such cases.  Reference has already been made to Kline, above n 10, 
on the inapplicability of the F.O.I. laws to documents held by the Official Secretary to the Governor-General 
relating to nominations for awards in the Order of Australia. 
98 Council of Civil Service Unions, [1985] AC 374, 418. 
99 (2001) 54 OR (3rd) 215. 
100 In response to the memoirs of the Canadian Prime Minister in question, Lord Black puts his side of the story 
in a recent newspaper article : “As I Recall …”, “National Post”, 8 December 2018, p. A19. 
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claimed that this action occurred for an improper purpose – indulgence in a personal vendetta; the 
plaintiff was a newspaper publisher – the Court held that it would not interfere for the reason stated.  
This was because no-one had a right to an honour nor a legitimate expectation of receiving one and 
the award of an honour involved no liberty, property or economic interests.101  It is, of course, no 
longer in order to say that the source of a power in the prerogative renders it exempt from judicial 
review, but yet some prerogative powers are of a nature which makes them unsuitable for curial over-
sight and/or renders such oversight unnecessary. 
 
While some of the reasoning in Black is certainly open to question102 – a chat between two Prime 
Ministers in itself alters no legal rights and no more needs the support of the Royal prerogative than 
does cooking the prime ministerial lunch in the official residence103 – the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
came to the correct conclusion on the facts in front of it for the reasons stated.  One writer who, in 
line with modern authority initiated by Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service,104 
deprecates categorical subject-matter exemptions for particular fields of government activity has sug-
gested that, even if decisions to grant or withhold honours are justiciable, there would at most need 
to exist ‘a rational and impartial process for candidates to be identified and considered’.105  Given that 
such a thing exists in both Canada and Australia, there is no need for any further judicial oversight.  
(Arguably, however, in the United Kingdom such an institution has existed only since the Honours 
Committees were set up in 2005106 – yet it was never suggested there that the lack of such a thing 
made decisions not to grant honours susceptible of judicial review.  And there is always room for 
arguing that a process is not quite rational or impartial enough.)  As there is no statute involved, there 
is also no room for the commonly heard rationale that Parliament must have intended the power to 
                                                             
101 At [60] – [62]. 
102 See, for example, Klinck, “Modernising Judicial Review of the Exercise of Prerogative Powers in Canada” 
(2017) 54 Alberta LR 997, 1004. 
103 On this point, there is an interesting and thoughtful English essay : Tomkins, above n 8. 
104 [1985] AC 374.  It is surprising to find that, after a third of a century, this decision has not been expressly 
approved by the High Court of Australia, but it is very reasonable to assume that it is applicable here : Ar-
onson/Groves/Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (6th ed., Law Book, 
Pyrmont 2017), p. 125. 
In R (ex rel. Miller) v. Johnson [2019] 3 WLR 589, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, in concluding that 
the decision to prorogue Parliament under the prerogative was justiciable, emphasised its important political 
and constitutional consequences (at 604-608). This reasoning aligns with the main point made by the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario cited in the text, namely that refusing honours should not be justiciable because no legal 
interest is affected by it. 
105 Klinck, above n 102 at 1025. 
106 Even they were not statutory, as an enquiry had recommended : McKeown/Thomson, above n 4 at 84.  See 
further Heydel-Mankoo, “Reform of the United Kingdom Honours System : An Analysis of Recent Develop-
ments” in Jackson (ed.), above n 25, ch. 8. 
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be exercised in accordance with the rules of procedural fairness.  Finally, ‘there is no satisfactory legal 
yardstick by which the issue can be resolved’107 – who is to say, as an objective matter, whether a 
person deserves no honour or an honour of a particular, and if so which grade?  It is true that ss 12 (1), 
15 (1), 17 (1) and 18A of the Order of Australia’s constitution contain general descriptors of the sort 
of service for which membership in it should be awarded.  For example, under s 12 (1) ‘Appointments 
as Companions or honorary Companions in the General Division shall be made for eminent achieve-
ment and merit of the highest degree in service to Australia or to humanity at large’, whereas for 
Officers ‘distinguished service of a high degree to Australia or to humanity at large’ is required.  Quot-
ing these, however, merely emphasises the lack of legally assessable standards.  For all these reasons, 
the better course, given that honours do not provide anything beyond symbolism – ‘no legal right of 
the citizen is engaged whether in public or private law’108 – and much of the process must occur in 
secret anyway,109 is to agree with the Court that the process of awarding honours, at least, is outside 
the realm of judicial review.  What sort of person, anyway, would be found in Court arguing for the 
grant of an honour? 
 
Lord Black avoided the problem in the end by renouncing his Canadian citizenship and thus depriving 
the Prime Minister of that country of the right to object to his ennoblement.  His next move on the 
honours front was to have himself convicted and sent to prison for crimes in the United States of 
America, following which proceedings were started to deprive him of his appointment as an Officer of 
the Order of Canada.110  Thereupon he claimed the right not merely to make submissions on the ques-
tion to the Advisory Council, but also to appear in person before it in order to present his case.  He 
claimed that legitimate expectations were created by the published policy on the termination of ap-
pointments111 (the equivalent of our Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance).  In a brief decision112 
                                                             
107 Curtis v. Minister of Defence [2002] 2 NZLR 744, [27]. 
108 Shergill v. Khaira [2015] AC 359, 378. 
109 See above, fn 73. 
110 Section 3 of the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 (U.K.) was passed partly against this same background, but 
see s 3 (9) relating to overseas convictions.  Lord Black is currently listed as being on leave of absence from the 
House, and it would seem that there has been no resolution of the House under s 3 (9) requiring the Lord 
Speaker to act against Lord Black.  Even such action, however, would not deprive his Lordship of his title; he 
would merely become a peer who is not eligible to take part in the sittings of the House.  Only an Act of Parlia-
ment (e.g. Titles Deprivation Act 1917 (U.K.)) can deprive a peer involuntarily of that dignity. 
It should also be noted that, on 15 May 2019, his Lordship received a presidential pardon for the offences of 
which he was convicted: Donald Trump, “Executive Grant of Clemency”, <https://www.justice.gov/par-
don/page/file/1163776/download>. 
111 This is available at https://www.gg.ca/en/honours/canadian-honours/order-canada/constitution.  It is 
clearly much more elaborate than our Ordinance and does not leave to guesswork, for example, the question 
whether the proposed victim may make representations, not merely an objection : it says so explicitly. 
112 Black (Lord) v. Advisory Council for the Order of Canada [2013] FCA 267. 
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the Federal Court of Appeal held that there was no question of Lord Black’s credibility that would 
make it desirable for him to be seen in person and dismissed the claim.  Australian case law certainly 
supports the proposition that there is no general right to an oral hearing, and the question is a practical 
one depending on the facts of the case, which may include any undertakings made by the authorities 
about the course of proceedings and any need to see the person affected in order to assess credibil-
ity.113  On the facts of Lord Black’s case, there certainly did not seem to be any type of serious foothold, 
either by reason of undertakings or by reason of the nature of the case against him, for the argument 
that he should have the opportunity of a personal appearance.  The Judges however did not express 
a view on the questions of justiciability or even the existence of a legitimate expectation. 
 
If the question of justiciability relating to terminations and cancellations of awards is ever fairly raised, 
what should the law be?  Depriving someone of an honour granted is a step of such gravity, particularly 
for reputational purposes, that review by the Courts is warranted and the question should be justici-
able.  If someone does not receive a proposed honour, hardly anyone will even know (unusual cases 
involving litigious Canadians, peerages and international negotiations aside).  On the other hand, in 
Australia the deprivation of an honour must receive publicity in the official gazette at least under reg. 7 
of the Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance.  Furthermore, there is an evident difference in prin-
ciple between not honouring someone with an award and removing an award already granted.  Unlike 
the dismissal of a minister dealt with in Stewart v. Ronalds,114 such a step does not raise matters of a 
political nature in the narrow or high sense, and there are clear legal standards for the removal of an 
award set out in the Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance such as being convicted of a criminal 
offence, obtaining an award by misrepresentation or committing disreputable acts.  Even leaving aside 
the concept of legitimate expectation, therefore – which Australian case law certainly requires us to 
do115 – the deprivation of an honour is in and of itself justiciable and procedural fairness at least is 
required. 
 
This conclusion requires the somewhat spare wording of our Terminations and Cancellations Ordi-
nance to be interpreted accordingly : thus, the right to lodge an objection must be read as the right to 
lodge an objection that is supported by reasons (not merely a bald statement to the effect that “I, the 
recipient of this award, object to the proposed termination of it; signed A.B.”) and also to have those 
                                                             
113 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v. “W.Z.A.R.H.” (2015) 256 CLR 326, 336-339, 341, 343f. 
114 (2009) 76 NSWLR 99. 
115 “W.Z.A.R.H.”, (2015) 256 CLR 326, 334f, 343. 
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reasons properly considered by the Council or the Governor-General (which does not of course mean 
that thousands of pages of material can be submitted).  No doubt that conclusion simply reflects cur-
rent practice in the very few cases in which terminations are considered,116 but it is comforting to 
know that a footing, although perhaps not the firmest imaginable, can be found for it in the Ordinance 
as well as in the common law.  Probably, too, in the most unlikely event that an award were terminated 
for a reason not set out in the Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance or for an improper purpose, 
on irrelevant considerations etc. a declaration to that effect would be available, although such a case 
is extremely unlikely to arise in practice and need not be further pursued here.  Unfortunately, how-
ever, s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Clth) would not apply, as there is 
no decision under an enactment as distinct from an instrument made under prerogative power, and 
accordingly the common-law rule applies : there is no legal duty to give reasons.117 
 
In the final Canadian case, Drabinsky v. Advisory Council of the Order of Canada,118 the plaintiff claimed 
to have a legitimate expectation of an extension of time to put his submissions against the cancellation 
of his award so that he would be able to prepare materials after his release from prison, but there was 
nothing in the materials to support such an extension.  The policy in question did permit extensions 
to be granted – another omission in our own, so carefully drafted Terminations and Cancellations Or-
dinance – but it certainly made no promises that they would be granted.  Accordingly, even assuming 
the question was justiciable (on which the Court again did not commit itself), no legitimate expecta-
tion could have arisen.  The Court also held that there was no duty to give reasons for the termination 
of an award nor anything in the policies that would support a legitimate expectation to that effect.  
This is a fortiori true of our Terminations and Cancellations Ordinance and given the state of our case 
law. 
 
                                                             
116 Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor-General, above n 85 at 92, states : ‘The process requires 
that the member is given the opportunity to respond to any allegations before a recommendation is made by 
the Council to the Governor-General.  Any response is provided to the Council for consideration.’  On the fol-
lowing page we learn that there have been forty-two terminations from 1992 to 2016, an average of under 
two per year. 
117 In addition, the Ombudsman cannot act, as the Office of the Official Secretary is not a department within 
the meaning of s 5 (1) (a) of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Clth). 
118 [2015] FCA 5. 
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b.  New Zealand – Knighthoods across the ditch 
 
One of the most curious aspects of the restoration of Knighthoods in 2014 and the “Sir Prince Philip” 
controversy in 2015 was the absence of much reference to the position in New Zealand.  Unlike Aus-
tralia, New Zealand has two orders,119 both created, for some reason, by the slightly less grand method 
of a Royal Warrant.  The older and more prestigious is the Order of New Zealand, which, like the Order 
of Merit (a Commonwealth award which originally is British)120 on which it was partly modelled, carries 
no titles but only the post-nominal “O.N.Z.”.121  It is limited to only twenty members.122  The second 
order, the New Zealand Order of Merit, however, was originally created in 1996 with five levels, the 
two highest of which were Knights; there may be fifteen junior Knights appointed per year, far more 
than the four allowed by the Abbott changes in Australia, to which are added no more than thirty of 
the more senior level of Knights alive at any one time.123  While these titles were removed under the 
Labour government only four years after the Order’s creation, in 2000124 – partly so as not to over-
shadow the more prestigious, but titleless Order of New Zealand, and partly because of dislike of the 
                                                             
119 This is to omit the Queen’s Service Order, a smaller Order but actually older, having been instituted in 1975 
like the Order of Australia.  It is not considered here as it has never conferred a titular distinction and its mem-
bership is comparatively small.  However, three members of the Royal Family are also Companions of this Or-
der, including Prince Philip. 
120 Full members may include persons from any country of which The Queen is Sovereign, and at the time of 
writing two former Commonwealth prime ministers were members : the Rt Hon. Jean Chrétien P.C., O.M., C.C., 
Q.C. and the Hon. John Howard O.M., A.C.  The same criterion of eligibility exists for both New Zealand orders, 
which under their statutes are available not merely to citizens of New Zealand, but to anyone whose Sovereign 
is The Queen.  According to one commentator, ‘New Zealand has correctly understood that Commonwealth 
citizens share a common bond and should not be regarded as alien’, although it may be countered that this 
understanding evidently applies only to citizens of Her Majesty’s realms and not to the republics within the 
Commonwealth : Heydel-Mankoo, “Assessing the Honours of New Zealand – An Example for Canada” in Jack-
son (ed.), above n 25 at 131.  See further O’Shea, “New Zealand Honours” in Jackson (ed.), above n 25 at 60, 
62f. 
121 Statutes of the Order of New Zealand, SR 1987/67, cl. 15. 
122 Statutes of the Order of New Zealand, SR 1987/67, cl. 4. 
123 Statutes of the New Zealand Order of Merit, SR 1996/205, cl. 9. 
124 Additional Statutes of the New Zealand Order of Merit, SR 2000/84; existing holders of the titles were not 
affected, but new titles could not be conferred. 
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titles as anti-egalitarian125 – in 2009 they were reinstated by the conservative government led by John 
Key – now Sir John.126 
 
A survey of the reaction to the restoration of 2009 indicates a mixed reception, with many voices in 
favour as well as against;127 there was nothing like the incomprehension, hostility and ridicule that 
greeted the second coming of Knighthoods in Australia five years later.  According to one commenta-
tor, Key’s ‘popularity rose, in part because everyone who had been given a lesser award was allowed 
to upgrade to a Knighthood or Damehood.  By co-opting a whole class of community leaders, the critics 
were disarmed.’128  I am not sure that the ordinary New Zealander would have been much impressed 
by that aspect of the change, but at any rate such a step was not available in Australia : in New Zealand 
it could be done because the two highest levels of the New Zealand Order of Merit were still awarded.  
Awards from 2000 to 2009 were not ‘lesser’ but had simply been renamed and stripped of the titular 
distinction.  But in Australia, on the other hand, a separate category above the existing ones was cre-
ated in order to re-introduce Knighthoods, and it would hardly have been rational to upgrade all A.C.s 
for the previous forty years to Knighthoods and invidious to divide forty years of recipients into two 
classes or select a later cut-off date for any such step.129  At any rate, the present Labour government 
in Wellington has shown, to date, no inclination to restore the position adopted by its predecessor in 
2000. 
 
                                                             
125 Fox, above n 2 at 217f; Fox, “An ‘Imperial Hangover’?  Royal Honours in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
1917 – 2009” (2014) 7 Britain & the World 6, 13; O’Shea, above n 120 at 62.  The first reason given in the text, 
not overshadowing the O.N.Z., was the reason given for preferring, ‘not […] without regret’ (p. 12), a titleless 
O.N.Z.M. in the report of the Prime Minister’s Honours Advisory Committee, The New Zealand Royal Honours 
System (Cabinet Office, Wellington 1995), pp. 12f, 72-74. 
126 Additional Statutes of the New Zealand Order of Merit, SR 2009/90.  Those who had received the two high-
est levels after 2000 were eligible to be re-designated as Knights or Dames, and even widows of deceased gen-
tlemen in that category became eligible to apply for the courtesy title “Lady”. 
127 Fox, above n 2 at 223-225 (including positive reaction from the republican movement in New Zealand); Fox, 
above n 125 at 24-26. 
128 Patrick, above n 3 at 113. 
129 Following New Zealand’s decision was also specifically ruled out by Mr Abbott in a press conference rec-
orded in “P.M. Transcripts : Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia”, i.d. no. 23367, at : 
http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-23367.  In October 2019, reflecting on his time in office, 
Mr Abbott declared that he ‘should have found a way’ of following New Zealand's lead and upgrading past 
honours to Knighthoods but did not say how the practical problems of doing so could have been mastered : 
Troy Bramston, “Turnbull’s Ambition was My Undoing, Says Abbott”, “The Australian”, 7 October 2019, p. 1 
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Not only that : in 2012 Prince Philip was made a member of the Order of New Zealand, ‘for services to 
New Zealand’ as the citation ran.130  While this was not a Knighthood strictly so called, it was an ap-
pointment to the most prestigious Order that New Zealand had to offer, and the citation might be 
thought particularly incongruous : in Australia there was, perhaps mercifully, no citation owing to the 
special method – an amendment to the Constitution of the Order of Australia – adopted for conferring 
a Knighthood in the Order of Australia upon His Royal Highness.131  As was only to be expected, in New 
Zealand there was criticism of this appointment from republican quarters, but only a little,132 and also 
some support133 – again nothing like the reaction when a comparable step occurred three years later 
across the Tasman.  Perhaps another reason for this was that the failure of Mr Key, as he then was, to 
consult his colleagues about this step ‘was out of character for him.  Unlike Abbott, Key didn’t need 
advice about such basic political skills as listening to colleagues.’134 
 
Strikingly, there is no Council for either order in New Zealand : in both cases nominations are made by 
the Prime Minister or other Minister.135  The idea of a council was rejected when the Order of New 
Zealand Merit was instituted on the grounds that advisory councils were not perfect either, public 
nominations were already permissible in New Zealand and this fact simply needed better publicity, 
the introduction of a new honours system was not the time for a significant change in procedures, the 
existing system had mostly been successful anyway, and ‘governments have the most powerful of 
reasons for preparing balanced lists that will win public approval, and that is the scrutiny of Parliament 
and people’.136  While the award of a Knighthood to Prince Philip certainly indicates that this scrutiny 
can occur, it is not the case that governments will usually stand or fall by every entry in the honours 
lists.  Public nominations are still accepted in New Zealand and there is now an application form for 
the purpose, but only a cabinet committee to consider the granting of awards.  That is certainly not 
an example that Australia should follow. 
 
 
                                                             
130 New Zealand Gazette, 29 June 2012, p. 2091. 
131 See above, fn 86. 
132 Patrick, above n 3 at 113. 
133 See, for example, Nicholas Jones, “O.N.Z. Makes the Duke a Top Kiwi”, “New Zealand Herald”, 4 June 2012, 
p. A1. 
134 Errington/van Onselen, above n 90 at 128. 
135 Statutes of the Order of New Zealand, SR 1987/67, cl. 10; Statutes of the New Zealand Order of Merit, 
SR 1996/205, cl. 11. 
136 Prime Minister’s Honours Advisory Committee, above n 125 at 76. 
34 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
It may be safely conjectured that Tony Abbott’s experiment with the re-introduction of Knighthoods 
has killed them off in this country forever, or at least for a very long time.137  In theory a conservative 
government could attempt to repeat the Abbott move, but as long as memories of the Knighthood to 
Prince Philip remain alive it is most unlikely to do so.  The Australian Labor Party, for its part, has long 
led resistance to titles, although its sister party in the United Kingdom is currently led by a Knight of 
the Realm and its record was patchy until recently : while its platform contained a plank opposing 
Imperial (and thus titular) awards since 1918, assorted Labor governments sometimes broke with this 
stance.138  No modern example of such behaviour exists, however; the Labor Party’s stance nowadays 
is quite clear, and it was responsible for the removal of Knighthoods from the Order of Australia in 
1986, although this step was not greeted at the time with universal acclaim.139 
 
Not everyone will contemplate the end of Knighthoods without a tinge of regret that such appalling 
and insensitive marketing has now rendered them virtually a taboo in Australian public life.  They are 
a distinction that is understood and respected internationally and an adornment of various offices 
such as Governor-General and Chief Justice that still sometimes seems conspicuous by its absence.  
We often hear about the need to adapt ourselves to the customs of the Asia/Pacific region, and there 
Knighthoods are an indulgence that various societies permit to themselves : as well as New Zealand’s 
home-grown Knighthoods, in Malaysia the title “Datuk” is comparable to Knighthoods, and Imperial 
Knighthoods remain available in Papua New Guinea, our former colony, ‘on the advice of Her Majesty’s 
Papua New Guinea Ministers’.140  The form of address consisting of “Sir” or “Dame” plus first name is 
also a happy and convenient compromise, in speaking to the great and the good, between the stiffness 
of Mr/Ms etc plus surname and the excessive informality of just the first name alone.  Finally, they are 
a worthy reward to and inducement for philanthropists, such as those who gave the money to found 
                                                             
137 See above, fn 79. 
138 Fox, above n 2 at 212f; Fox, above n 125 at 11; Fox/Furphy, above n 79 at 97; Review of Australian Honours 
and Awards, above n 6 at 13; Whitlam Q.C., above n 17 at 139f.  See also the Labor-inspired motion in New 
South Wales Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 September 1923, pp. 1068-1078. 
139 See above, fn 79. 
140 E.g. London Gazette, 8 May 2017, p. 9404 – G.C.M.G. for the Governor-General. 
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the University of Adelaide and more or less in return received the title “Sir”141 – an exchange which 
both parties to it considered excellent value. 
 
In addition, ‘[f]or some Australians, the withdrawal of British honours appears to have created a void 
which Australian honours have failed to fill’ reported the Review of Australian Honours and Awards142 
after conducting a wide public survey in October 1994.  The same review received twenty-eight sug-
gestions for the reinstatement of Knighthoods or titles – it was among the top ten suggestions re-
ceived from the public – although three others took the trouble to make a stance against that very 
thing143 and the Review’s sense was that ‘the overwhelming public opinion was strongly against 
Knighthoods’.144  At that point, of course, the memory of Imperial titles was twenty years fresher than 
it was in 2014, although that was not necessarily a positive thing given the dubious character of some 
of the people knighted in Queensland, for example.  Nevertheless, there is still some evidence that 
the absence of Knighthoods is occasionally felt in this country : in December 2018 advocacy from the 
sporting world for knighting Shane Warne and Dennis Lillee was heard.  While it is possible that there 
is a bit of the larrikin spirit and perhaps not always complete seriousness behind the proposal to knight 
Mr Warne in particular, it was pointed out that he was the only player not knighted on Wisden’s poll 
of the five greatest cricketers of the twentieth century and this was an injustice that should perhaps 
be corrected by a Knighthood from The Queen.145  There is of course no mechanism now for doing so; 
rarely, Australians are still knighted in the British list,146 but only for services to the United Kingdom 
such as Mr Warne could not claim – his appearances for English county sides would hardly suffice for 
a Knighthood – and since Sir David Smith K.C.V.O., A.O. in 1990 there have also been no Australian 
appointments at Knighthood level to the Royal Victorian Order or to any other Knighthood, such as 
the Garter, still theoretically available to Australians qua Australians.  Certainly, however, Dennis Lillee 
                                                             
141 The reference is to Sir W.W. Hughes and Sir Thomas Elder.  Both performed services to South Australia be-
yond their endowments for the University of Adelaide, and there is no official statement of what the balance 
was between those other services and their donations to the University in securing them Knighthoods, but it is 
tolerably clear that their Knighthoods were based in large part on the enormous sums of money they lavished 
upon the infant University of Adelaide.  Sir W.W. Hughes, for example, lived in England from 1873 until his 
death, but even almost a decade and a half later his obituary in the Times (“Obituary”, 7 January 1887, p. 10) 
began its summary of his life by referring to him as the ‘“Father” of the University of Adelaide’.  
142 Above n 6 at 101. 
143 Above n 6 at 164. 
144 Above n 6 at 187. 
145 Peter Rolfe, “Oh, What a Knight : Push for Warnie to Become ‘Sir Shane’”, “Herald Sun” (Melbourne), 22 
December 2018, p. 5. 
146 The most recent example is Sir Frank Lowy A.C.  As Australians thus knighted are of course subjects of The 
Queen, even if in a different capacity, they are permitted to bear the title “Sir” or “Dame”, which is not availa-
ble to others. 
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would have been a better candidate for the revived Australian Knighthoods of 2014 than Prince Philip, 
from every imaginable point of view! 
 
A further curiosity is that some of those leading the opposition to Knighthoods even before the “Sir 
Prince Philip” debacle bore much longer and wordier titles such as “Senator the Honourable”.  Indeed, 
of the four people who resigned from the Order of Australia in 1976 upon and owing to the first com-
ing of Knighthoods in the Order in that year, three ended their lives with earned or honorary doctor-
ates.147  (The exception was Patrick White.) 
 
What it is that makes the one-syllable handle offensive to the taste of so many while honorary doc-
torates or the eight syllables of “Senator the Honourable” are not?  One answer is that each of those 
eight syllables reflects a distinction conferred, directly or indirectly, by popular election (unlike doc-
torates), and thus such titles may be considered exceptions to the egalitarian dislike of distinctions 
among citizens148 : these distinctions are conferred by the citizens themselves.  Another is that the 
title “Sir” or “Dame” is conferred in a post-colonial, or perhaps more accurately post-Imperial context 
in which it appears to compromise the too easily won independence of Australia and its separate na-
tional identity – often too close a copy of the old British-Australian identity for comfort and in desper-
ate need of points of distinction.149  That aspect was quite evident in the case of the award to Prince 
Philip, and indeed this perspective provides a slightly more elaborate underpinning for the extreme 
lack of sense shown in conferring such an award. 
 
Nevertheless, there were also good reasons, needless to say, for the opposition to the restoration of 
Knighthoods.  As well as the obvious objections relating to aping the British and undermining our egal-
itarian myth that have just been referred to in passing, another is that honours systems have been 
attempting to adapt to the modern world and as a result ‘have increasingly drawn on public nomina-
tion and have placed far greater emphasis on recognition of people according to the contribution they 
                                                             
147 Cf. Fox, above n 2 at 216f; Fox/Furphy, above n 79 at 100f. 
148 This is an aspect that is elaborated on with much interest and profit by Fox, above n 2, who, at 225, refers 
to the view that titles are quite egalitarian, as long as everyone has a more or less equal opportunity to attain 
one.  Another difficulty with the argument from egalitarianism, besides its status as myth and far from a com-
plete account of our society’s actual nature, is that, if equality requires the abandonment of titles, it must also 
result in the abandonment of post-nominals and the abolition of all honours. 
149 Fox, above n 125 at 7; Fox/Furphy, above n 79 at 110f. 
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have actually made rather than the status of the position they hold’.150  Clearly an automatic Knight-
hood for the Governor-General ran contrary to that, although only it was likely that one person would 
be so honoured every five years and there are still those who find it jarring to hear the Governor-
General bear the title “Mr” or “Ms”.151  However, the new de facto possessor of the power to award 
Knighthoods, the Hon. A.J. Abbott M.P., in his press conference announcing their restoration explicitly 
linked the award to the holding of an office – it was to be for ‘those who have accepted public office 
rather than sought it and who can never, by virtue of that office, ever entirely return to private life’; 
he gave examples such as chief justices and defence force chiefs.152  And all Australian appointments 
in 2014 and 2015 were indeed the “usual suspects”, distinguished, it is true, by their outstanding con-
duct and service, but also on the basis of the offices they held.  Where Prince Philip stands in this 
respect need hardly be stated. 
 
Despite the final demise of Knighthoods in Australia, there are still lessons to be learnt from this epi-
sode.  One question is why the Order of Australia provides virtually the only remaining example in this 
country of prerogative legislation.  Malcolm Hazell says that parliamentary legislation was avoided as 
a means for setting up the Order because Letters Patent ‘provided a degree of tradition and continuity 
with the former scheme of Imperial honours and, importantly, maintained the source of authority for 
the honours system above politics’.153 
 
                                                             
150 Bonsey, above n 66 at 10. 
151 Hence the view of Keith Windschuttle in “Chronicle” (2015) 58:5 Quadrant 4, 5 that ‘because the Australian 
honours system introduced by the Whitlam government has so far worked well, any future recommendations 
for Knights and Dames should be confined solely to Vice-Regal personae’. 
This notice appeared in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 8 May 2013, C2013G00681 : 
The title ‘the Honourable’ for Governors-General 
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ian Governors-General. 
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Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
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152 “P.M. Transcripts : Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia”, i.d. no. 23367, available at : 
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This preserves flexibility, although flexibility also has its perils even for those to whom it is available, 
let alone to the body politic as a whole.  Dr Wayne Errington and Professor Peter van Onselen provide 
this interesting explanation for the restoration of Knighthoods under Mr Abbott : 
 
Certainly, [the reinstatement of Knighthoods in 2014] was an emotional decision that arose 
from the constrained policy choices his party and the institutions of democracy presented to 
him, and over-compensation in the realm where he could exercise the leadership freedom he 
craved.  Abbott’s problem was that his realm of leadership freedom was vanishingly small.  All 
his life he had worked loyally within institutions to get to the top and exercise his version of 
moral leadership.  His experience as a political leader had made him painfully aware of how 
vociferously some of his social views were opposed, which had damaged his self-confidence.  
The surprising thing about Abbott’s government was how little it achieved in the cultural 
realm given that Abbott himself had worked towards these goals for so long.  Re-introducing 
Knights and Dames was not a lunge from the cliff, but a cry for help.154 
 
With some sacrifice of flexibility, such temptations would be removed if a statutory basis existed for 
the Order of Australia and the Royal prerogative to create further societies of honour were abolished 
(a step which would not prevent the creation of further stand-alone medals such as those for bravery 
and long service and those marking important state occasions.  Alternatively, existing awards of that 
type could be “grandfathered” and delegated legislation could be the sole means of establishing fur-
ther such awards, which would mean that they could be disallowed by either House of Parliament.)  If 
it were thought desirable, or as a selling-point, such legislation could also specifically rule out titular 
distinctions in the Order of Australia.  Such legislation would certainly be a break with the Imperial 
past, but hardly one even of the significance of discontinuing the wearing of wigs in Parliament,155 and 
it would also not necessarily compromise the status of the Order of Australia as an institution above 
politics, as Malcolm Hazell feared.  Indeed, it is evident that the only major political controversy at-
taching to the Order of Australia over its more than forty years of existence has been due to its easy 
amenability to executive fiddling without the need for parliamentary consent.  It should not be difficult 
                                                             
154 Errington/van Onselen, above n 90 at 93. 
155 There are precedents for such legislation within Her Majesty’s realms, such as the National Honours Act 
1998 of Antigua and Barbuda. 
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to draw up legislation for the Order of Australia which would receive bipartisan support; such legisla-
tion would of course be assented to by the Crown;156 and it would put the Order on a firm basis as an 
expression of the will of the highest organ of the state, its Parliament.  Such legislation would also 
need to deal with the question of the justiciability of decisions made to withhold or remove awards. 
 
If that proposal is not accepted, or only in the longer term, an issue raised above is whether the Letters 
Patent including the Order’s constitution should continue to be issued from Buckingham Palace or 
Yarralumla.  We saw that there is no legal impediment to transferring the source of the constitutional 
arrangements from the former to the latter, although for the sake of avoiding arguments a specific 
authorisation could be procured.  Some will prefer the view that the source of all Australian laws, 
even – or perhaps especially – exercises of the prerogative power, should be located in Australia.  
However, the awards themselves, which occur twice yearly and are therefore far more prominent 
than dusty old constitutional documents, are now unequivocally sourced in Australia; Her Majesty’s 
only involvement is in receiving a list of awards after the fact.  If her position as Sovereign of the Order 
is to mean something, it must have some duties attached, and there is little to gain and only prestige 
to be lost by changing the issuer of the Letters Patent.  Perhaps there might also be some small addi-
tion to the stability of the Order’s constitutional arrangements owing to the extra step involved in 
seeking approval from London and a small degree of greater reluctance to propose questionable steps 
to The Queen, although this did not save the Abbott government from embarrassing itself.157  There 
are real concrete advantages in setting up the Order by way of Act of Parliament, but nothing much 
to be gained and a little that would be lost by moving the Letters Patent from the Royal to the Vice-
Regal office-holder. 
 
One matter that should be attended to is the role of the federal government’s and the States’ and 
territories’ representatives on the Council of the Order.  As we have seen,158 there is no clarity at all 
about who exactly these people represent – is it the community of the polity concerned, the govern-
ment or something else?  There have even been suspicions expressed by people who should know 
that such positions have been used – let us say frankly : abused – for the purpose of procuring awards 
                                                             
156 If desired, it could even be reserved for Her Majesty’s personal assent, although this is certainly not consti-
tutionally necessary and would probably be out of step with contemporary taste in such matters.  It would be a 
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for someone favoured by a political leader.  The independence of the process for awarding the Order 
of Australia is one of its most attractive features and a vast improvement on the old Imperial awards, 
but here is a point at which the perception, at least, is not in line with this aspiration – possibly even 
the reality in rare cases.  This perception is not dispelled when we find that high-ranking public serv-
ants are many jurisdictions’ preferred appointees to the Council. 
 
No easy solution exists.  One simple, although not necessarily effective expedient would be simply to 
clarify the issue of whom these appointees represent in the Order’s constitution : a new sub-section 
could state that they are not representatives of their governments nor even subject to their instruc-
tions but represent instead the whole polity from which they are taken.159  However, it may well be 
that better representatives of the States and territories can be found.  Could each jurisdiction be re-
quired to nominate someone by vote in both Houses of its legislature?  Some members of University 
councils were once elected in that way, occasionally legislation such as s 21 (1) (f) of the Tobacco Act 
1987 (Vic.) still provides for such a procedure, and surely one person in each State and territory could 
be found who is capable of receiving sufficient cross-party support.  Such a process would promote 
the selection of people who are independent and not reliant upon a government for their re-appoint-
ment, whether in return for services rendered on the Council or otherwise.  If applications were called 
for, a further step would be taken to promote public involvement in the Order and the transparency 
of its decision-making.  Consideration could also be given to ensuring that there is always one member 
of the Council who is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin, perhaps included within the Prime 
Minister’s quota of eight places on the Council. 
 
The Order of Australia will celebrate its golden anniversary in 2025 – a jubilee which might prompt its 
administrators to sponsor the missing general history of it and an enterprising historian to take up 
that challenge by producing a history comparable to Dr McCreery’s general history of the Order of 
Canada.160  It can certainly be said, however, that the Order of Australia has proved its worth over its 
nearly fifty years of existence and the principles on which it is founded are generally sound.  Never-
theless there is always room for improvement.  The ideas of giving the Order a statutory basis, stating 
that the governmentally appointed Council members are not representatives of their governments 
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but of their communities and having State Parliaments elect the States’ representatives on the Council 
of the Order are desirable improvements that are wholly within the Order’s existing principles. 
